Sergey Kadinsky

Written Works

This research article was written in the Summer of 2006, as a Media Fellow at the Jerusalem office of The Israel Project.

How do the

Russian People

View Iran?

To many Americans, the idea of Russian public opinion is almost nonexistent, with the assumption that the ultimate decision rests on the president of Russia. However, with the growing presence of public demonstrations, many of them led by extremist populist parties, public opinion is becoming an increasingly important factor in Russian foreign policy. This is also important to consider in light of the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.

Though the Cold War is over, many Russians remain cautious about the United States and its image as the sole remaining superpower. A recent poll conducted jointly by Yuri Levada Institute in Russia and the World Public Opinion Institute in the United States, there is a wide gap between how the American and the Russian public perceives Iran. While 68% of Americans favor some form of trade embargo with Iran, only 23% of Russian respondents agree with this view.[1] In regards to having the United Nations Security Council should still pursue negotiations “if Iran continues to produce nuclear fuel that could be developed for use in nuclear weapons,” 62% of respondents in Russia said “yes,” while 26% of Americans opined that there was nothing more to talk about, according to the poll.

The failure of the Russian public in perceiving Iran as a possible threat to Russian interests in Chechnya, and as a nuclear power means that President Vladimir Putin would have little incentive to pursue sanctions, especially if the public were to view that such an actions would be nothing more than to bow to American pressure to do so.

As a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Russia and China, who are the leading members of this group, have to face the prospect of admitting Iran as a full member. Presently, Iran holds observer status at the SCO, but is lobbying for full membership. Viewing the alliance as a possible counterweight to NATO and the western powers, Iran also hopes to persuade Russia and China to use their Security Council veto powers to prevent sanctions from being issued.

The leading Russian supporter of full Iranian membership is Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the deputy speaker of the Russian parliament, and leader of the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party. According to Zhirinovsky, Iran wants to become a permanent member and we must assist it, in order to enhance the SCO and protect Iran,”[2] As a former presidential candidate, Zhirinovsky’s LDPR is the third largest party in Russia, after President Putin’s United Russia, and the Communist Party. Using nationalist appeal, Zhirinovsky believes that Russia must unite with Iran to prevent American aggression in the region.

Aside from nationalist appeals, some Russian foreign policy experts believe that admitting Iran as a full member would not only prevent Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons, but also open the country to foreign influence. According to Sergei Karaganov, who heads the Russian Foreign and Defense Policy Council, “Iranian participation would be one of the carrots that could be used by the international community to make deals with Iran, because, until now we have seen only the stick.”[3]

Stephen Weber of associate director of World Public Opinion (a project of the Program on International Policy Attitudes) believes that the Russian and American publics actually have more in common in their view of Iran, “Both agree that the UN should discourage countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Both agree that Iran is trying to head toward the development of nuclear weapons. Both publics strongly favor diplomacy over bombing Iran's nuclear facilities, and while Americans favor the UN invoking economic sanctions if necessary. Russians oppose economic sanctions and support more diplomacy," Weber concluded.[4]

Among the concerns which have the Russian public being more sympathetic towards Iran is the belief that Iran could control terrorist groups in Chechnya and Iraq, and that if Russia assists Iran in developing nuclear energy, Iran would be less likely to fund Chechen separatist groups. When Iraqi insurgents kidnapped four and milled one of the Russian diplomats in the Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad, the possibility of Iran emerging as a mediator emerged as a realistic possibility. After three weeks of failed negotiations, On June 25^th, Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi declared that Iran is willing to assist in releasing the kidnapped journalists, if requested to do so by Russia.[5] Even if Iran is not successful in securing the release of the four hostages from the Mujahideen Shura Council, an Al Qaeda-linked group, the move may be perceived by the Russian public as a goodwill gesture, and further decrease the image of Iran as a threat to Russia.

By joining the SCO as a full member, Iran would further drive Russian public opinion to its side through cultural programs, such as exhibits and performances that would show Iran “beyond the conflict.” To give further support to the idea that negotiations are a better alternative to sanctions, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki states that a “positive atmosphere that has been created over the Iran nuclear file could create the best opportunity to pave the way to reaching an understanding.”[6] Mottaki’s statement shows that in exchange for some incentives from Europe and Russia, Iranian leaders have toned down their rhetoric. Mottaki’s statement comes in contrast to a speech given by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a month earlier in the town of Zarandieh. At the rally, he claimed that countries “who get upset at the happiness and progress of others are suffering from a mental problem and therefore should find a way to cure themselves.” At another rally in the town of Arak, Ahmadinejad also ridiculed European proposals to offer incentives in exchange for a moratorium on nuclear enrichment. "They say they want to give us incentives. They think they can take away our gold and give us some nuts and chocolate in exchange," Ahmadinejad told the audience.[7]

Though Iran has welcomed negotiations with Russia and the Europeans, Iranian officials refuse to declare a moratorium on uranium enrichment, declaring such a move to be a “step back.”[8] At this time, it appears that Iran remains committed to uranium enrichment at the same time as it is negotiating over European incentives to stop the program.

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